Joint FAO/OIE Committee on Global Rinderpest Eradication - Final Report

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Joint FAO/OIE Committee on Global Rinderpest Eradication
Final Report
May 2011
Table of Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . Findings of the Joint Committee. . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . Annex A – Terms of Reference of the Joint Committee . . . . . . . . . . . Annex B – List of Members of the Joint Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 71 73 73 Annex C – List of other relevant missions and invited participants. . . . . . . Annex D – List of Countries and Territories officially recognised as free . . . . from rinderpest infection Annex E – Guidelines for Rinderpest Virus Sequestration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex F – References on which the Joint Committee based . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 . 77 . 79 . 81
. . . . . 75 . . . . . 75
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
CMC-AH BWTC - Crisis Management Centre for Animal Health (FAO/OIE) - Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
EMPRES FAO
- Emergency Prevention System for Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases (FAO) - Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme (FAO) - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Terrestrial Manual Terrestrial Code
Scientific Commission
OIE
Joint Committee
IAEA
GREP
- Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals (OIE) - World Health Organization
FAO & OIE © 2011
- Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (OIE)
- World Organisation for Animal Health
- Joint FAO/OIE Committee for Global Rinderpest Eradication
- International Atomic Energy Agency
WHO
- Terrestrial Animal Health Code (OIE)
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I. BACKGROUND
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) have been engaged in a process aiming to achieve certified global freedom from rinderpest, with an initial target in the year 2010. The task of both organizations was to ensure that every country with susceptible animal populations in the world be listed, by way of self-certification and finally by OIE official recognition of rinderpest infection-free status, on a global rinderpest-free database. In 2005, a number of OIE Member Countries were yet to undergo a mandatory OIE dossier-based evaluation process for entry to this database. For non-OIE Member Countries an alternative process was required. In May 2007, OIE adopted a new set of rules for rinderpest accreditation. It was essential that for the 2010 deadline, both the OIE and FAO review the implications of the new provisions and agree on the extent of the work still to be done and on a joint action plan to ensure its success. During the Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme (GREP) expert's consultative meeting held in September 2007 at FAO headquarters, it was recommended that: 1) FAO (GREP and the FAO-IAEA Joint Division) and OIE should establish a Standing Commission and Global Scientific Commission to start immediate preparations for the final scientific evidence for global verifiable absence of rinderpest virus in the natural environment. This would lead to the Declaration of Global Freedom from rinderpest by the two partner organizations in 2010. 2) FAO and OIE should start developing a legal framework for the Declaration and the associated national obligations for assuring the maintenance of global freedom from rinderpest, including the code of practice for virulent rinderpest virus isolates still held by certain countries. OIE was notified by FAO of the above recommendations and in October 2007 OIE suggested to "... draft an internationally acceptable common plan of action to be communicated during the OIE and FAO General Assemblies.". The proposed Standing Commission and Global Scientific Commission were based on the World Health Organization (WHO) experience on the eradication of smallpox in the 1970s. There was some scepticism as to the achievements of
the eradication process and a reluctance to dismantle public health measures designed to combat smallpox. WHO had determined that in order to convince the international community of the success of its programme an independent review process was required. A formally constituted International Commission for the Global Certification of Smallpox Eradication was called into being to provide consultative assistance to WHO and verification of the eradication achievement by the Global Commission. The ultimate responsibility of the Global Commission – once it was satisfied that worldwide eradication had been achieved – was to document the reasons for its decisions in a way that would allow the World Health Assembly to declare in 1980 that smallpox had been eradicated. From October 2007 to early 2009, discussion was pursued between FAO and OIE to establish an independent committee whose major task would be to recognize achievement of global freedom from rinderpest. Both organizations accepted the inherent value of running this exercise jointly within a time-bound framework and accepted that the timetable originally developed under GREP should be concluded, if possible, in 2010. The proposed OIE/FAO Standing Commission was to review annually progress in accreditation. In doing so, the Standing Committee was to duplicate the role already undertaken by the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases of OIE. In alternative to establishing a Standing Commission, the Scientific Commission of the OIE and FAO-GREP Secretariat could work closely together, assisting countries and reviewing progress. It was then proposed that the end-point of this process would be the development of a joint proclamation that there is no extant transmission chain anywhere in the world. This last step should be achieved through the establishment of a Global Scientific Commission or a Joint FAO/OIE Committee for the Global Eradication of Rinderpest (following the model of the World Health Organisation Global Commission for the Certification of Smallpox Eradication). The agreement between FAO and OIE establishing the Joint FAO/OIE Committee for Global Rinderpest Eradication ( Joint Committee) was concluded in June 2009. The main function of the Joint Committee was to provide a report of its findings to the Directors General of FAO and OIE, stating whether they are confident that the world can be declared free of rinderpest and/or recommend the actions
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to be taken for this achievement to be settled. More concretely, the Joint Committee was to: 1) advise the Directors General of FAO and OIE on potential gaps and risks of the proof of rinderpest freedom efforts to allow a firm statement declaring the end of rinderpest virus circulation in the world; 2) draft a joint FAO-OIE text for the global declaration of rinderpest freedom in mid-2011; and 3) draft an international agreement outlining principles and responsibilities for oversight and regulatory actions to ensure rinderpest freedom in the post-eradication era. The Joint Committee was composed of a total of seven highly qualified individuals, i.e. three nominees from each organization and an additional, independent Chairman. It was also decided that where necessary, additional experts would be invited on an ad hoc basis to address a specific topic. The Terms of Reference of the Joint Committee are attached in Annex A of this report. The members of the Joint Committee are given in Annex B of this report. Other participants invited to attend meetings of the Joint Committee as well as staff of FAO and OIE are listed in Annex C. The Joint Committee held four meetings: (i) 3 December 2009, FAO headquarters, Rome, (ii) 13-14 April 2009, OIE Headquarters, Paris, (iii) 15-16 July, Joint FAO/IAEA Division, IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, and (iv) 13-14 January 2011, OIE Headquarters, Paris. The work of the Joint Committee benefited by it attending the FAO workshop on post-eradication activities with participation of OIE, held on 12 October 2010 at FAO headquarters.
Development of the OIE pathway and evaluation of country applications
The Joint Committee recalled that the guidelines for surveillance were originally developed and published in 1989 by the OIE as a guide to assist its Members in demonstrating freedom from rinderpest post-vaccination for self-assurance. It was a prerogative to cease vaccination and proceed to the next steps of the pathway leading to disease freedom. In 1999, OIE Members endorsed the decision to establish a baseline list of historically rinderpest-free OIE Members. In 2000, a first list of officially recognized rinderpest free Members was adopted by the body now referred to as the World Assembly of the OIE Delegates. Other Members were then required to submit detailed evidence for claims of rinderpest freedom. The Joint Committee accepted the concept of historical freedom in accordance with relevant OIE standards (baseline list of Year 2000, which counted 86 countries as free of rinderpest infection). The Joint Committee further noted that following the recommendations of the OIE Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases which took into account the progress of global rinderpest eradication and the knowledge of the distribution of historical rinderpest risks amongst different regions of the world, the World Assembly of the OIE Delegates agreed to allowing countries of selected regions to be evaluated in the same way as were the 86 countries that had entered the baseline list in the year 2000; a list of countries located in world regions that never faced rinderpest outbreaks (Americas except Brazil, the Caribbean, New Zealand and Oceania) and countries located in regions that managed to eradicate rinderpest several decades earlier (Western part of Europe, Brazil and Australia) was elaborated by the ad hoc Group on rinderpest and was endorsed by the Scientific Commission in 2008. This re-opening of the so-called baseline list considerably accelerated the progress in the official recognition of historically rinderpest infectionfree countries. The Joint Committee noted that the Scientific Commission of the OIE (formerly known as "Foot and Mouth Disease and Other Epizootics Commission" until 2003) was tasked to review applications for official recognition of rinderpest free status on its own until 2004. From 2004 onwards, the Scientific Commission requested the support of an ad hoc Group composed of rinderpest experts to evaluJoint FAO/OIE Committee
II. FINDINGS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
Information on disease situation in countries and relevant activities
The Joint Committee was given access to the OIE archive of sanitary reports, amongst others, on rinderpest since 1924 as reported by OIE Members. The Joint Committee observed that the number of infected countries worldwide had steadily decreased. The Joint Committee was also given access to FAO archives and was fully informed of the GREP activities in regions and countries (Annex F).
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ate the submitted dossiers, in particular of those Members not historically free, and provide its recommendations to the Scientific Commission for consideration. The Scientific Commission, in turn, forwarded its proposals on the recognition of rinderpest-free status of countries and territories to the World Assembly of the Delegates for adoption. In January 2011, the ad hoc Group evaluated the last remaining countries and the process of reviewing the rinderpest freedom of all 198 relevant countries and territories (having susceptible animal populations) in the world was completed. The Joint Committee commended this endeavour. The Joint Committee supported the evidence and conclusions detailed in the ad hoc Group reports and acknowledged the expertise of the members of this ad hoc Group as well as the Scientific Commission.
International standards for diagnosis and vaccines
The Joint Committee noted that in 1991, the OIE Biological Standards Commission (then known as the Standards Commission) initiated a programme for the development of international standards for laboratory diagnosis of rinderpest and for the manufacture of rinderpest vaccines. This activity resulted in the harmonisation of test protocols and the designation of reference reagents to be used in these tests, facilitating surveillance and greatly contributing to the successful outcome of the campaign for rinderpest eradication. These standards are published in the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals.
FAO efforts toward the eradication of rinderpest
The Joint Committee found that FAO (including through the Joint FAO/IAEA Division) since its foundation, provided substantial technical assistance through major campaigns in Asia throughout the 1950s and 1960s and those in Africa from 1960 through 1976, contributing to bring the disease largely under control. However, because of weaknesses in operational and structural follow-up, rinderpest resurged and spread widely in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. The FAO Council at its 83rd Session, in June 1983, endorsed the recommendation by the Committee on Agriculture regarding the need to formulate national and international strategies for animal health, including the action to control rinderpest. Particular concern was expressed on the resurgence of this disease in Africa, Near East and Asia. The Council
also requested FAO to provide assistance to African countries to control the disease and to mobilise support for the newly proposed Pan African Rinderpest Campaign (PARC) through the International Office of Epizootics (OIE), the Organization of African Unity and the European Economic Community. In 1987, FAO held the Expert Consultation on global strategy for the control and eradication of rinderpest. The experts concluded that the global eradication was justified and feasible by expanding the campaign from Africa to the Middle East and South Asia. FAO Expert and Technical Consultation meetings assisted in coordinating several regional campaigns in Asia, the Middle East and Africa as well as ensuring that national campaigns were fully abreast of technical issues as well as the opportunity for information exchange in terms of disease occurrence, incidence or prevalence at country and regional level. These efforts aimed to guide countries in vaccine production and quality control, emergency vaccination campaigns, along with OIE pathway, and then provide assistance in surveillance activities and assembly of evidence needed for preparing country dossiers, which in turn were evaluated by OIE. The Joint Committee also recognized the contribution of diagnostic and training networks; establishment of diagnostic laboratories and guidelines formulation. ELISA technology was developed in the early 1980s from a research tool into an affordable diagnostic laboratory technology. Performance Indicators as well as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for rinderpest sero-monitoring, sero-surveillance and related Quality Assurance aspects were completed. From 1994, FAO has strengthened its responsibility for technical leadership and global coordination through the Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme (GREP) with year 2010 as the projected deadline for rinderpest eradication. Following technical consultation in late 1998, an Intensified GREP was launched, marking the transition to the final eradication thrust, based on epidemiological understanding of suspected reservoirs of infection in marginalized extensive high risk pastoral systems. The focus was the containment, elimination and proving freedom of disease. The Committee also acknowledged the established laboratory networks and their role in sero-monitoring and surveillance. The Joint Committee noted that GREP had been successful and had achieved, in cooperation with the OIE and
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partners, its stated objective of eradicating rinderpest virus by the 2010 deadline (last outbreak in 2001 and last use of vaccine in 2006). The socio-economic analysis on the eradication programme also supports this achievement.
III. CONCLUSIONS
In the light of the findings above, the Joint Committee concluded that: 1. Rinderpest as a freely circulating viral disease has been eliminated from the world (Annex D); and 2. The presence of virulent or attenuated rinderpest virus in laboratories constitutes a potential threat to global biosecurity.
Cooperation between governments, international and regional organizations and other partners
The Joint Committee observed that the commitment of national veterinary services was pivotal. Contributions of reference laboratories, advanced diagnostics and molecular epidemiology were also significant. The Committee also acknowledged the important roles played by networks of specialist groups supported by the OIE and FAO, and by specialized regional organizations such as the Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources of the African Union and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, amongst others. These concerted efforts allowed to obtain that there was no evidence for residual foci in domestic or wildlife species. Other actors such as regional organizations and donors made significant contributions to the process of eradication.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. A resolution should be taken forward by FAO and OIE, for adoption by their governing bodies, declaring global rinderpest eradication and implementing subsequent necessary measures; 2. Guidelines on rinderpest virus sequestration as agreed by the Joint Committee in consultation with the OIE Biological Standards Commission (Annex E) should be implemented by national veterinary authorities, OIE and FAO; 3. FAO and OIE should, as a matter of urgency, continue to work in close collaboration on the following: a. Develop a strategic plan to guide the post-eradication activities at international level; b. Complete an analysis of the risks of re-emergence of rinderpest virus, and its consequences; c. Prepare an international contingency plan based on the risk analysis; d. Set up a joint FAO/OIE Advisory Body on rinderpest, defining terms of reference and membership; this Advisory Body may set up subcommittees, for example to monitor rinderpest research activities; 4. National veterinary authorities should update national contingency plans in line with the guidelines for rinderpest virus sequestration and the international contingency plan; 5. FAO and OIE should establish an appropriately funded mechanism for oversight and approval of facilities holding rinderpest virus containing material, in conjunction with national regulatory authorities and, where appropriate, with other international organizations; 6. FAO and OIE should maintain archives of existing documents (including country dossiers); digitization of files
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Virus sequestration
The Joint Committee noted that virulent and attenuated rinderpest virus samples and vaccine stocks continued to be held in laboratories in a number of countries worldwide. The Joint Committee noted that FAO and OIE were in the process of establishing an inventory of institutes holding rinderpest virus-containing material through questionnaire surveys. Preliminary results of these surveys indicated that virus-containing material was stored in varied biosecurity conditions in over 20 countries. The Joint Committee was informed of WHO experience on smallpox eradication and noted that many approaches taken by WHO were also applicable to rinderpest in designing post-eradication activities.
Significance of global rinderpest eradication
The Joint Committee noted that socio-economic analysis on the eradication programme suggested that rinderpest eradication could be considered as a global public good. The Joint Committee also noted that the experience gained during the rinderpest eradication process should be kept and be used for future eradication of other animal diseases.
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should be considered where possible, as well as identification of documentation that should be made publicly accessible; 7. FAO and OIE should find and collate suitable education and training materials, particularly films of rinderpest disease, and package them in a way that is accessible to as wide an audience as possible, through official websites and other publicly accessible file depositories on Internet; 8. National authorities should ensure that: a. Rinderpest remains a notifiable disease; b. A surveillance system (including rumour tracking and early detection) be maintained to detect disease events; c. Suspect cases, including undiagnosed die-offs, be rapidly investigated (using existing mechanisms or, where appropriate, the FAO/OIE Crisis Management Centre-Animal Health) and necessary actions be promptly taken; 9. On-going support for FAO/OIE rinderpest reference laboratories should include adequate funding for maintenance of diagnostic capability; 10. FAO/OIE rinderpest reference laboratories should ensure inter-collaboration; 11. The use of rinderpest vaccines should be forbidden except for emergency use in the case of a rinderpest outbreak; 12. FAO and OIE should provide guidelines on control procedures, including the use of emergency vaccination; 13. Research on historical strains of rinderpest should continue, given that full sequencing promotes greater understanding of Morbillivirus evolution and full sequence data reduce the need to retain live virus stocks;
14. Re-creation of rinderpest virus from full genome sequences should be forbidden except in an authorized biosecure facility on approval by FAO and OIE; 15. An international Morbillivirus discovery and monitoring programme should be promoted and knowledge gained in rinderpest eradication should be transferred to potential control programmes for other Morbillivirus infections; 16. The need for possible novel (e.g. differentiating infected from vaccinated animals) vaccines and diagnostic tests should be determined by the Advisory Body in the light of the risk analysis; 17. Vaccines (including related equipment) should be manufactured in accordance with the OIE Terrestrial Manual and held in sustainably-funded vaccine repositories (vaccine banks), coordinated by FAO and/or other appropriate bodies and in liaison with manufacturers; minimum number of repositories should be determined by the Advisory Body in the light of the risk analysis; 18. FAO and OIE should vigorously pursue the publication of experiences on rinderpest control and eradication in a book; 19. International standards and guidelines on rinderpest, including the OIE Terrestrial Code, OIE Terrestrial Manual, and FAO Manuals, should be updated in the light of global eradication; and 20. A specialist rinderpest secretariat should be maintained by FAO and OIE with adequate resources to deliver the rest of these recommendations, including the support to activities of the FAO/OIE Advisory Body.
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TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
Review all FAO (including FAO/IAEA) projects devoted to rinderpest surveillance, diagnosis, containment, and research, including those projects where FAO may not have been a lead organization; II. Receive reports from the OIE on the infection free status of countries and territories and other related information, as well as ongoing activities of FAO and OIE to assist countries and territories to submit required dossiers for official recognition of their free status by OIE. III. Advise the Directors General of both organizations indicating whether the evidence presented to the Committee entitles them to announce that rinderpest virus has ceased to circulate in the world;
A N N EX A
I.
IV. Prepare, based on the technical assistance of the OIE Biological Standards Commission, a draft international agreement on the elimination of rinderpest virus and other potentially dangerous biological materials in laboratories and other places and on the choice of a limited number of centres where sample materials can be stored safely for research or vaccine production purposes; V. Advise OIE and FAO on surveillance and emergency vaccination policy applicable after eradication; and, VI. Contribute to guiding the preparation of a publication on the history of rinderpest and its global eradication.
LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
Dr Yoshihiro Ozawa 1-15-2(3404) Tamagawa, Setagaya-Ku, Tokyo, 158-0094 JAPAN Prof. Steven Edwards Oak House, Vowchurch Hereford HR2 0RB UNITED KINGDOM Prof. Arnon Shimshony Tabenkin st 37a Tel-Aviv 69353 ISRAEL Dr William Taylor, Chair 16 Mill Road, Angmering Littlehampton BN16 4HT UNITED KINGDOM Prof. Jean-Frangois Chary Conseil general de l'agriculture, de l'alimentation et des espaces ruraux 251 rue de Vaugirard 75352 Paris Cedex 15 FRANCE Dr James E. Pearson 4016 Phoenix Ames, Iowa 50014-3918 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Dr Daouda Sylla B.P. 2376 Bamako MALI
A N N EX B
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LIST OF OTHER RELEVANT MISSIONS AND INVITED PARTICIPANTS
A N N EX C
A. Missions
Somali Ecosystem (Addis Ababa-Ethiopia from 28 March to 2 April 2010): J. Pearson and D Sylla WHO (Geneva, 3 – 4 June 2010): K. Miyagishima (OIE) and F. Njeumi (FAO) Biological Weapons Convention Unit, UNODA (Geneva, 4 June 2010): F. Njeumi,(FAO)Iran to investigate suspected case of rinderpest (24 December 2009 to 3 January 2010): G. Kiani (FAO)
Dr Gerrit Viljoen, Head Animal Production and Health Section, Joint FAO/IAEA Division Fourth Meeting: Dr Peter Roeder, Member of the OIE ad hoc Group on Evaluation of country Status for Rinderpest and former GREP Secretary Dr Michael Baron, OIE/FAO Reference Laboratory on Rinderpest Dr Hermann Unger, Animal Production and Health Section, Joint FAO/IAEA Division
B. Invitees to the Joint Committee meetings First Meeting:
Dr David Ulaeto, Advisor to WHO's Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research Dr Gerrit Viljoen, Head, Animal Production and Health Section of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division, Vienna, Second Meeting: Dr Piers D Millett, BWC Implementation Support Unit, UNODA Professor Geoffrey L. Smith, former Chair of WHO's Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research Third Meeting: Dr Daniel Lavanchy, former member of WHO Secretariat for Smallpox Eradication Dr Karim Tounkara, Director Pan African Vaccine Institute PANVAC Dr Adama Diallo, Head Animal Production and Health Laboratory, Joint FAO/IAEA Division
C. FAO and OIE Organizations
FAO Dr Modibo Traore, Assistant Director-General Dr Samuel Jutzi, Director Animal Health and Production Division Dr Juan Lubroth, Chief, Animal Health Service Dr Felix Njeumi, Animal Health Officer, GREP Secretariat Dr Gerrit Viljoen, Head, Animal Production and Health Section, Joint FAO/IAEA Division OIE Dr Bernard Vallat, Director General Dr Kazuaki Miyagishima, Deputy Director General Dr Elisabeth Erlacher-Vindel, Deputy Head, Scientific and Technical Department Dr Lea Knopf, Officer in charge of official recognition of disease status Dr Jong Joo Kim, Charge de mission, Scientific and Technical Department Ms Sara Linnane, Scientific Editor, Scientific and Technical Department
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LIST OF COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES OFFICIALLY RECOGNISED FREE FROM RINDERPEST INFECTION (MAY 2011)
Member Comoros Congo Congo (Dem. Rep. of the) Costa Rica Cote d'lvoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Djibouti Dominican Rep. Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Fiji Finland Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Guatemala Guinea Guinea Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland
A N N EX D
1. OIE Members with rinderpest susceptible animals :
(BL) : Baseline list of historically rinderpest free countries NR : Rinderpest was reported to have never occurred in the country
Member Afghanistan Albania Algeria Andorra Angola Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China Chinese Taipei Colombia last outbreak 1995 1934 NR NR 1972 NR 1928 1923 (import) 1881 1928 NR 1980 1958 NR NR 1920 NR 1987 1971 NR 1883 1899 1921 (import) NR 1913 1988 1934 1964 1986 NR NR 1983 1983 NR 1955 1949 NR listed 2008 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2009 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2011 2011 2009 2010 2001 2008 2000 (BL) 2009 2005 2005 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2009 2000 (BL) 2006 2006 2010 2010 2000 (BL) 2009 2010 2010 2000 (BL) 2008 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL)
last outbreak NR NR 1961 NR 1986 1883 NR NR 1881 1782 1985 NR NR 1986 NR NR 1995 NR 1995 NR 1877 1883 1870 NR 1965 1989 1870 1988 1926 NR 1967 1967 NR NR NR 1881 NR 1995 1907 1994 1996 1866
listed 2011 2006 2006 2000 (BL) 2007 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2010 2009 2000 (BL) 2006 2000 (BL) 2008 2005 2000 (BL) 2008 2009 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2008 2011 2010 2000 (BL) 2007 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2006 2006 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2006 2000 (BL) 2008 2009 2000 (BL)
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Member Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Korea (Dem. People's Rep. of ) Korea (Rep. of ) Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Libya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Micronesia (Fed. States of ) Moldova Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Netherlands New Caledonia New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay
last outbreak 1983 1947 NR 1924 1972 1928 2001 1948 1931 1985 1928 1966 1921 1982 1896 1963 19th century NR NR NR NR 1935 NR 1986 NR 1986 NR NR NR NR 1992 1883 NR 1896 1957 1905 1990 1869 NR NR NR 1986 1987 NR 1995 2000 NR NR NR
listed 2010 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2008 2011 2009 2009 2000 (BL) 2010 2011 2011 2000 (BL) 2008 2000 (BL) 2009 2009 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2003 2000 (BL) 2010 2006 2000 (BL) 2007 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2011 2000 (BL) 2005 2009 2000 (BL) 2007 2006 2000 (BL) 2002 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2009 2010 2010 2000 (BL) 2009 2007 2000 (BL) 2009 2000 (BL)
Member Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syria Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Timor Leste Togo Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States of America Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela Vietnam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe
last outbreak NR 1955 1921 NR 1987 1886 1998 1932 NR 1950's (import) 1999 1978 1883 NR 1958 1930 1881 1883 1983 1904 NR 1994 1998 NR 1898 1700 1871 1983 1949 1997 1959 NR 1986 NR NR 1996 1954 1994 NR 1995 1900 NR NR 1928 NR NR 1977 1995 1896 1898
listed 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2010 2000 (BL) 2010 2006 2009 2011 2011 2005 2008 2009 2011 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2010 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2011 2008 2009 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2010 2008 2007 2004 2009 2005 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2005 2011 2008 2000 (BL) 2011 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2008 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2000 (BL) 2010 2006 2000 (BL)
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2. Non OIE-Members with rinderpest susceptible animals:
Countries or Territories Antigua and Barbuda Cook Islands Dominica Grenada Kiribati Kosovo Liberia Marshall Islands Nauru Niue Palau Palestinian Autonomous Territories Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Samoa Solomon Islands St Vincent and the Grenadines Tonga Tuvalu Vatican last outbreak NR NR NR NR NR 1890s unknown NR NR NR NR 1983 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR listed 2011 2009 2010 2011 2011 2011 2011 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2011 2011 2009 2009 2009 2010 2011 2009
3. Non-contiguous Territories of OIE Members with rinderpest susceptible animals:
Country Australia Denmark Denmark France France France France France Morocco Netherlands Netherlands New Zealand Portugal Portugal Spain Spain Spain Spain UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK USA USA USA USA USA Non-contiguous territories Norfolk island Faroe Islands Greenland Mayotte French Polynesia Saint-Barthelemy Saint-Martin Wallis-et-Futuna Western Sahara Aruba Netherlands Antilles Tokelau Azores Madeira Ceuta Islas Baleares Islas Canarias Melilla Anguilla Bermuda British Virgin Islands Cayman Islands Falkland Islands Gibraltar Guernsey Isle of Man Jersey Montserrat Turks and Caicos American Samoa Guam Northern Marianas Puerto Rico US Virgin Islands Considered free 2009 2010 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009
GUIDELINES FOR RINDERPEST VIRUS SEqUESTRATION Endorsed with amendments on 28 January 2010 by the Biological Standards Commission of the OIE Endorsed with amendments on 14 April 2010 by the Joint FAO/OIE Committee on Global Rinderpest Eradication
Introduction
The global eradication of rinderpest creates a duty for the international community to prevent the re-emergence of the disease through release of virus from laboratory sources. To this end FAO and OIE shall establish the principle of international oversight and regulation of facilities holding rinderpest virus containing material. The objective of the present guidelines is to ensure secure handling and sequestration of rinderpest virus in the post-eradication
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A N N EX E
era. FAO and OIE and Member states undertake to reduce the number of virus repositories in order to minimise the risk of accidental release. FAO and OIE, in collaboration with Member states, will put in place global contingency plans and will ensure approval of a minimum number of repositories and Reference Centres/Reference Laboratories necessary to maintain preparedness against releases of the virus into the environment. These plans will include, amongst
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others, vaccine production, vaccine banks and deployment of vaccines in case of emergency. Vaccines should be available to countries for immediate dissemination in case of emergency. The following guidelines deal with biosafety and bio-containment measures to be observed in laboratories and other facilities holding rinderpest virus containing material.
Definitions
For the purpose of these guidelines the following definitions apply: An approved BSL3 facility means a facility that is jointly approved by FAO and OIE and subject to joint regular inspection. The facility meets BSL3 standards as defined in chapter 1.1.2 of the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals, is certified by the Veterinary Authority, and in addition has mandatory shower out for staff and either an exclusion zone or a restricted movement zone for rinderpest-susceptible species around the facility. Staff are subject to restriction on contact with susceptible species (e.g. on farms, in zoos)1. Rinderpest virus-containing material means field and laboratory strains of rinderpest virus; vaccine strains of rinderpest virus including valid and expired vaccine stocks; tissues, sera and other clinical material from infected or suspect animals; and diagnostic material containing or encoding live virus. Recombinant morbilliviruses (segmented or non-segmented) containing unique rinderpest virus nucleic acid or amino acid sequences are considered to be rinderpest virus. Full length genomic material including virus RNA and cDNA copies of virus RNA is considered to be rinderpest virus-containing material. Sub-genomic fragments of morbillivirus nucleic acid that are not capable of being incorporated in a replicating morbillivirus or morbillivirus-like virus are not considered as rinderpest virus-containing material. A detailed protocol on the approval and inspection process for BSL3 facility will be jointly developed by FAO and OIE. Veterinary Authority means the Governmental Authority of an OIE/FAO Member, comprising veterinarians, other professionals and para-professionals, having the responsibility and competence for ensuring or supervising the implementation of animal health and welfare measures, international veterinary certification and other standards and recommendations in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code in the whole territory.
Guidelines for rinderpest virus sequestration
1. All manipulation of rinderpest virus-containing materials, including vaccine production, shall be forbidden unless approved the Veterinary Authority and by FAO and OIE. An advisory body, jointly established by FAO and OIE, shall be tasked to approve in advance and monitor any activities involving the use of rinderpest virus-containing material. 2. All countries shall either destroy or transparently audit and manage all remaining rinderpest virus-containing material under
biologically secure conditions. The Veterinary Authority shall be kept aware of and be held responsible for any activity involving rinderpest virus-containing material. 3. Rinderpest virus-containing material, with the exception of stocks of packaged, manufactured vaccines, must only be kept, and can only be manipulated, in an approved BSL3 facility. 4. Master seed stocks must be maintained in, and tested by, the approved BSL3 facilities designated by FAO and OIE. Stocks of packaged, manufactured vaccines, as covered under rinderpest virus-containing material, shall only be kept in FAO and OIE approved facilities which are subject to joint regular inspection. Any expired vaccine stocks shall be destroyed by a validated process. 5. Rinderpest virus-containing material that is not in an approved BSL3 facility shall be destroyed by a validated process or transferred to an approved BSL3 facility. Its relocation or destruction shall be supervised and documented by the Veterinary Authority and be notified to FAO and OIE. 6. Transfers of rinderpest virus-containing material to an approved BSL3 facility located in another country must be notified to FAO and OIE; such material may remain the property of the country of origin. 7. Transport (intra and inter-country) arrangements for rinderpest virus-containing material shall be agreed by the relevant Veterinary Authorities in advance and in accordance with chapter 1.1.1 of the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals. 8. FAO and OIE shall establish and maintain a single global inventory on all existing rinderpest virus-containing materials, including vaccine stocks and the facilities holding such stocks and any movement of such materials. The global database shall be kept up-to-date on a permanent basis. 9. FAO and OIE shall develop a mechanism to facilitate and standardise reporting of rinderpest virus-containing material by Veterinary Authorities to update the global database. 10. FAO and OIE shall widely publicise the availability of internationally accessible rinderpest vaccine stocks to assist in convincing national authorities that they do not need to continue holding rinderpest virus-containing material. 11. 11. FAO and OIE shall develop a set of guidelines and standard operating procedures to govern the maintenance of rinderpest vaccine stocks and their use for emergency purposes. 12. FAO and OIE, through their Reference Centres and Reference Laboratories, (including the laboratory of the Joint FAO/ IAEA division) shall advise regional, national and international partners on laboratory-related issues having to do with rinderpest virus, including virus sequestration, destruction and disinfection protocols and diagnostic quality control. 13. FAO and OIE shall oversee the development of diagnostic kits that do not require the use of live virus within the kit itself or during the manufacture of the kit.
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Review Articles
REFERENCES ON WHICH THE JOINT COMMITTEE BASED ITS CONCLUSIONS
Reports of the meetings of the OIE Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (until May 2004 'OIE Foot and Mouth Disease and Other Epizootics Commission'):
1-4 February 2011, Paris 8-11 September 2009, Paris 19-21 February 2008, Paris 30 January – 1 February 2007, Paris 12-19 January 2005, Paris 11-12 August 2003, Paris 25-29 November 2002, Rio de Janeiro 21-25 January 2002, Paris 26-28 September 2000, Paris 18-22 January 1999, Paris 7-10 September 2010, Paris 11-13 February 2009, Paris 18-20 September 2007, Paris 19-22 September 2006, Paris 10-11 March 2004, Paris 16-17 & 22 May 2003, Paris 2-3 July 2002, Paris 17-21 September 2001, Paris 24-27 January 2000, Paris 2-5 March 2010, Paris 30 September – 2 October 2008, Paris 26-28 February 2007, Paris 7-9 March 2006, Paris 1-5 December 2003, Paris 12-14 February 2003, Paris 25-26 and 31 May 2002, Paris 23-26 January 2001, Paris 13-17 September 1999, Paris
A N N EX F
Reports of the meetings of the OIE ad hoc Group on Evaluation of Rinderpest Disease Status of Members (submitted to the OIE Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases):
11-12 January 2011, Paris 23-24 September 2009, Paris 5-7 February 2008, Paris 21-22 November 2006, Paris 7-8 January 2004, Paris 8-9 July 2010, Paris 30 January 2009, Paris 2-3 October 2007, Paris 12-14 September 2005, Paris 19-21 January 2010, Paris 18-19 November 2008, Paris 13-15 February 2007, Paris 20-22 October 2004, Paris
Reports of FAO – Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme Expert and consultative meetings from 1994 to 2010 (submitted to Director General, FAO).
Title GREP Symposium and High Level Meeting "Lessons learned from the eradication of rinderpest for controlling other transboundary animal diseases" FAO workshop on post-eradication activities with participation of OIE GREP Expert Consultative meeting "Rinderpest virus and vaccines sequestration" GREP Expert Consultation Meeting "Will rinderpest virus ever die? What lies beyond 2010" GREP Ad Hoc Group Workshop FAO-EMPRES Technical Consultation on the Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme "Maintaining momemtum and commitment". Verification of rinderpest freedom FAO Technical Consultation on the GREP: "The challenge ahead" FAO Technical Consultation on the Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme "The world without rinderpest" Emergency preparedness and contingency planning for rinderpest and other epidemic diseases emergencies Date 13-14 October 2010, Rome 12 October 2010, Rome 30 November – 2 December 2009, Rome 2-3 June 2009, Rome 25-26 September 2007, Rome 30 September-2 October 2002, Rome FAO Rome, 29-30 May 2000, Rome 28-30 September 1998, Rome 22-24 July 1996, Rome Joint FAO/EMPRES and OAU/IBAR workshop; 19-22 June 1995,
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